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Random number generators underpin the security of current and future cryptographic systems and are
therefore a likely target for attackers. Quantum random number generators have been hailed as the ulti-
mate sources of randomness. However, as shown in this work, the susceptibility of the sensitive electronics
required to implement such devices poses a serious threat to their security. We present an out-of-band elec-
tromagnetic injection attack on a photonic quantum random number generator through which an adversary
can gain full control of the output. In our first experiment, the adversary forces the binary output of the
generator to become an alternating string of 1s and 0s, with near 100% success. This attack may be spot-
ted by a vigilant user performing statistical tests on their output strings. We therefore envisage a second
more subtle attack in which the adversary forces the output to be a random pattern known to them, thus
rendering any protection based on statistical tests ineffective.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevApplied.15.044044
I. INTRODUCTION
Random number generators (RNGs) are essential for
a wide variety of applications, from lotteries to statis-
tics, from computer simulations to cryptography [1,2].
For some applications, e.g., computer simulations, the
RNG output is only required to be statistically random
whereas for others, like cryptography, it is critical that the
RNG output is also unpredictable. This guarantees that
an adversary cannot steal personal, financial, or classified
data by predicting or covertly controlling the output of
the encryption system. Unpredictable RNGs also underpin
the security of quantum key distribution, which provides
quantum-based protection to optical telecommunications
[3–5]. The generation rate of quantum key distribution
can decrease dramatically if the RNG output features even
a small imperfection, becoming partially known to the
adversary [6,7].
The necessity for unpredictable random numbers has led
to a colossal amount of research into “physical RNGs,”
whose randomness is based on physical processes from
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thermal noise to radioactive decay. Among these, “pho-
tonic RNGs” hold a special place due to the rich variety of
implementations they enable, from chaotic lasers to single-
photon sources, and the promise of integration on chip.
In response to our growing reliance on physical RNGs,
international standards such as FIPS, NIST SP 800-90B,
and AIS.31 [8,9] have been established to guarantee the
security of cryptography-orientated RNGs.
Securitywise, it has been shown that the randomness
of ring-oscillator-based RNGs can degrade if their circuits
unintentionally act as receiving antennas and pick up elec-
tromagnetic radiation from the surrounding environment
[10–15]. This undesired behavior can be turned into an
attack. In this case, the attack targets the source of random-
ness itself by locking the ring oscillators to the injected
signal. Such attacks, where an adversary injects signals
other than those intended to be detected to alter the value
of the output, are generally referred to as “out-of-band
signal-injection attacks” [16]. These attacks are particu-
larly dangerous because they can be executed remotely
and often target the connection between the sensor and the
analog-to-digital converter (ADC), which fundamentally
cannot be authenticated [16]. They are distinct from high-
power attacks aimed at disrupting, jamming, or burning
the victim’s system [17], or fault-injection attacks target-
ing digital electronics in cryptographic systems [18,19], or
even side-channel attacks based on physical leakage from
the devices [20,21]. Out-of-band signal-injection attacks
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have been demonstrated on RNGs based on ring oscil-
lators [22–28], medical implants [29] and drones [30],
among others [16]. However, there is no study yet of their
effectiveness against a quantum device.
As a special subset of physical RNGs, quantum RNGs
(QRNGs) provide randomness from a physical process that
is fundamentally quantum. The unpredictability of their
output is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics,
provided that their implementation meets the assumptions
made in their theoretical analysis. These assumptions typ-
ically identify a security perimeter that the adversary, Eve,
cannot cross. Eve can still have full knowledge of the non-
quantum characteristics of the devices within the perime-
ter, but cannot actively exploit them to make her attack
more effective. As such, it is assumed that the QRNG
is operated in a static environment, perfectly shielded
from external signals [1,2]. Such assumptions are hard
to justify in practice. As we find out, in the absence of
sufficient shielding, an adversary can control the QRNG
output through the unintentional antenna behavior of its
components.
In the following, we describe an out-of-band attack
against a QRNG, namely a continuous variable (CV
QRNG), which is based on the quantum properties of the
vacuum field and its subsequent detection via balanced
homodyne detection (BHD), see Fig. 1(a). CV QRNGs
have become popular due to their simple implementation
and high generation rate [31–41]. In most recent works,
they are implemented using commercially available BHDs
[33,34,36–41].
Earlier works used custom-made BHD circuits, which
were observed to suffer from picking up electromagnetic
noise from the environment due to the difficulty in shield-
ing the highly sensitive electronics involved [31,32,35].
This noise has a classical origin and is therefore typically
assumed to be passively monitored by, and hence known
to, Eve. The solution to maintain a high secure generation
rate has often been to calibrate the output power spec-
trum of the generator and generate numbers using only
the flat regions of the spectrum, which are free from these
large classical noise contributions. However, the elec-
tromagnetic background is unlikely to remain the same
during the operation of the CV QRNG, especially if a
malicious party is actively trying to control the generator
output.
In this paper we show how an attacker can create and
then actively exploit an electromagnetic side channel to
control the output of a QRNG whilst remaining undetected.
To prove our point, we experimentally demonstrate the
attack by targeting a typical CV QRNG that makes use of
the most recent BHD equipment. Our attack is not limited
to this setup and could be used against any system suscep-
tible to picking up electromagnetic signals, for example
generators based on chaotic semiconductor lasers, which
make use of similar components [42,43].
Our attack is based on electromagnetic injection and is
represented by the model in Figs. 1(b)–1(g). As shown in
Figs. 1(b)–1(d), in the absence of EMI we expect the out-
put of the CV QRNG to be Gaussian distributed, with zero
mean and variance σ 2 given by the sum of the quantum
noise σ 2Q, proportional to the power of the local oscilla-
tor, and the electronic noise of the measurement system
σ 2E [32,35,44–47]. The injected electromagnetic signal is
superimposed on this output, inducing a shift in the mean
of the Gaussian distribution. We assume that variations in
the induced shift broaden the shifted Gaussians, increasing
their standard deviation to σT. In contrast to the aforemen-
tioned attacks on ring-oscillator-based RNGs, this attack
targets the hardware between the photodiodes and the ADC
rather than the source of randomness itself, which is the
vacuum and therefore cannot be degraded through EMI. As
illustrated in Figs. 1(e)–1(g), Eve’s simplest attack strat-
egy is to inject a sine wave at half Alice’s sampling rate,
such that the mean of the odd samples is shifted to −A and
that of the even samples to +A. This results in the overall
distribution being double peaked.
In the general case where Alice has an ADC with mul-
tiple bins and a finite range R, Eve will aim to shift the
distribution such that almost all of Alice’s samples fall in
the outer bins, which we conservatively assume to extend
from ±R to ±∞. Given that the magnitude of the induced
shift is A, the probability of Eve incorrectly guessing
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(see Appendix A). In the following sections, we focus on
the case where Alice has only two bins, for which R = 0,
and present experimental results obtained when Eve is able
to synchronize her clock with Alice’s remotely. In this
case, the autocorrelation and conditional Shannon entropy
of the output can also be predicted (see Appendices B
and C).
II. RESULTS
A. Injecting sine wave
In our first implementation of the EMI attack, the
attacker exploits the electromagnetic side channel in a
bidirectional fashion by placing a pair of antennas in the
proximity of the QRNG, see Fig. 2(a). With one antenna
(Rx), Eve passively picks up Alice’s clock and synchro-
nizes with Alice’s ADC. With the second antenna (Tx)
she actively transmits a sine wave at half Alice’s sam-
pling frequency (see Appendix D for further details of the
experimental setup). Naturally, Eve can directly attempt
an active attack, however, as illustrated in Appendix E,
044044-2






FIG. 1. Models for QRNG and electromagnetic injection (EMI) attack. (a) Schematic of a typical CV QRNG setup used by the user
Alice to generate random numbers from measurements of the quadratures of the vacuum field. The setup consists of a local oscillator
(LO), a 50:50 beam splitter, on which the LO interferes with a vacuum state (blind port of the beam splitter), a BHD, in which the
outputs of two photodetectors (PDs) are subtracted to remove the common mode from the LO, and an ADC. The attacker Eve uses a
radio-frequency transmitter to perform the attack. (b)–(d) In the absence of EMI, the idealized experimental points, sampled at a much
higher rate and resolution than the user Alice uses, [orange dots in (b)] follow a discretized Gaussian with zero mean, represented as
a continuous distribution in (c),(d). Alice samples the waveform in correspondence with the dashed green lines in (b) and assigns a
number depending on which of her ADC bins [blue lines in (c),(d) and later on (f), (g)] the output falls into. Because only few samples
fall in the outer bins extending from ±R to ±∞ (red lines), Eve’s best guess of Alice’s numbers is the central bin (unshaded region).
The probability that Eve’s guess is wrong can be found by integrating over the shaded region. (e)–(g) When Eve injects a sine wave at
half Alice’s sampling frequency, it shifts Alice’s output, moving the mean values (magenta lines) to −A for odd samples (f) and +A
for even samples (g). Because Alice is unaware of this change, she will not modify the position of her bins [the blue lines in (f),(g) are
the same as those in (c),(d)]. The attack, however, makes the output likely to fall in one of the outer bins, thereby greatly decreasing
the probability that Eve, who now guesses Alice’s output will correspond to this outer bin, is wrong. As can be seen from the shaded
region in (f),(g) being much smaller than that in (c),(d).
the synchronization greatly improves the attack’s success
probability.
After setting the phase of her sine signal correctly, Eve
expects Alice’s output to be an alternating string of 0s and
1s, with the probability of her guessing each bit incorrectly
being given by Eq. (1) with R = 0. Looking at the his-
togram of the 8-bit ADC samples in Figs. 2(b) and 2(c) we
see that, as predicted, Alice’s overall output distribution
changes from a single Gaussian to a double peaked distri-
bution made up of two Gaussians centered at ±A when Eve
injects her electromagnetic signal. Eve can improve her
control of Alice’s output by increasing the amplitude of the
induced shift, A, either by placing her transmitting antenna
closer to the BHD, or by increasing the transmitted power.
The attack would also become more effective if Alice were
to reduce her LO power, lowering σQ and consequently σT.
In Fig. 2(d), we show how all these conditions can affect
the efficacy of the EMI attack (see Appendix F for further
details).
The attack described so far can give Eve full control of
Alice’s output. However, this version of the attack may
be spotted by a vigilant Alice who is performing statis-
tical tests on the ADC samples. The AIS.31 standards
for physical generators require that such tests be run
continuously to monitor the quality of output randomness
[8]. However, these tests are computationally intensive and
therefore are often not run continuously or at all in most
physical generator implementations [13]. Eve could there-
fore evade this countermeasure by restricting herself to
attacking only when Alice is not performing tests, e.g., by
monitoring the power drawn by Alice’s device in order to
ascertain when the tests are being run [20,48].
Even if Alice were to perform continuous randomness
tests, Eve could still attack continuously and remain unde-
tected if she can modify the injected signal to determine
the value of each bit at will. She could then send a ran-
dom sequence known to her which will pass Alice’s tests,
thus controlling Alice’s output whilst rendering her statis-
tical tests ineffective. In the following section we present
an implementation of such an attack.
B. Injecting random patterns
There are potentially many different schemes which Eve
could use to transmit her random pattern to Alice, includ-
ing variations on frequency shift keying and the use of
phased arrays of antennas. We choose to implement a
scheme inspired by binary phase shift keying in which the
044044-3
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(a)
(b) (c) (d)
FIG. 2. First experiment on EMI attacks. (a) Schematic of the setup used in the experiment. LO, local oscillator; BS, beam splitter;
BHD, balanced homodyne detector; Tx. Ant, transmitting antenna; Rx. Ant, receiving antenna; ADC, analog-to-digital converter; PS,
power supply. (b),(c) 8-bit histograms of output without (b) and with (c) EMI, with the overall distribution shown in blue and the
subsampled distribution, taking every other point, shown in orange. (d) Dependence of the proportion of bits Eve guesses incorrectly
on the normalized amplitude of the shift, A√
2σT
, she induces in Alice’s output.
carrier wave, at half Alice’s sampling frequency, is mul-
tiplied by a non-return-to-zero pattern at Alice’s sampling
frequency using a mixer. This enables Eve to flip each bit
at will (see Appendix D).
This scheme is chosen because it can be implemented
with common lab equipment and a single transmitting
antenna. In order to force Alice’s output to replicate her
desired pattern, Eve must ensure that the power spec-
trum of the CV QRNG output closely matches that of
her transmitted signal for at least one whole sideband.
This is challenging to achieve in practice as the rf fre-
quency response of Alice’s setup is unlikely to be flat
across a whole sideband, i.e., her setup is unlikely to
be equally good at receiving signals across a whole
sideband.
In our implementation, we concentrate on sending
strings of repetitive 32-bit patterns, chosen using a pseudo
RNG. Counting the number of matches between the
sequence injected by Eve and the measured output for
1 281 250 samples in 3000 different patterns, we find an
average match of 69.8% with a standard deviation of 6.7%,
as shown in Fig. 3(b). This match can be interpreted as the
probability of Eve correctly guessing each bit of Alice’s
output. Eve could extend these patterns to arbitrary lengths
in order to better conceal her attack.
Much of the mismatch between Eve’s injected sequence
and the one obtained by Alice can be attributed to the rf
frequency response of Alice’s setup. Figure 3(a), obtained
by sending a repeating 8192-bit pattern and sampling the
output at 40 GSamples/s using an 8-bit oscilloscope, shows
that the CV QRNG setup is poor at picking up injected
signals below 500 MHz, as is clear from the mismatch
between the power spectra of the output from Eve’s mixer,
shown in blue, and that of Alice’s CV QRNG output, in
orange. This in turn leads to the loss of the longer runs,
i.e., uninterrupted sequences of identical bits, in Alice’s
output, as shown in Fig. 3(c), and consequently a lowering
of the average match. As highlighted in Fig. 3(e) the match
decreases almost linearly with the length of the longest
run in the pattern Eve is attempting to transmit. This is
due to the loss of the low-frequency components in the
received signal. Eve ought to be able to correct for this dis-
tortion and increase her match if she has prior knowledge
of the frequency response, by amplifying the parts of the
spectrum for which the frequency response is weaker prior
to transmission. Otherwise she could increase her average
match by restricting herself to sending patterns containing
only short runs.
Despite this imperfect match between Eve’s target and
the patterns received by Alice, it is clear from the autocor-
relation shown in Fig. 3(d) that the received patterns have
32 sample-long repeating patterns within them. If instead
of comparing the CV QRNG output to that of Eve’s mixer
we compare it to itself, taking the first 32 bits of Alice’s
output as the pattern, the average match rises to 88.7%
with a standard deviation of 4%, as shown in Fig. 3(b).
The remaining mismatch is attributed to the lack of power
in the injected signal. Therefore Eve’s guessing probability
044044-4





FIG. 3. Injecting random patterns. (a) Comparison between
the power spectra of the output from Eve’s mixer (blue) and
that of the CV QRNG output in the absence (green) and pres-
ence (orange) of EMI when Eve is attempting to send a repeating
8192-bit pattern. The lower sideband of Eve’s signal in which
she requires the power spectra to match is shown by the red
dashed perimeter. (b) Histograms of proportion of bits matched
between 3000 32-bit patterns transmitted by Eve and the corre-
sponding outputs from the CV QRNG (orange), and the match
obtained by instead assuming Eve knows the first 32 bits in the
CV QRNG output and comparing this with the remainder of
the output (blue). (c) Comparison of occurrence of different run
lengths in the patterns sent by Eve and those received by Alice.
(d) Mean absolute autocorrelations of mixer and CV QRNG out-
puts showing that a repeating 32-bit pattern is present in both.
(e) Dependence of proportion matched on length of maximum
run present in the transmitted pattern.
would improve considerably if she was aware of how her
pattern had been distorted.
Now consider a second scenario in which Alice uses the
band from 625 MHz to 1.25 GHz to generate her output.
Eve can adapt her input, using the upper sideband rather
than the lower sideband to transmit her pattern by setting
her carrier wave frequency to 625 MHz and mixing this
with a 1.25-GHz pattern. In this case, after filtering our
experimental results show that Eve’s match increases to
88% on average with a standard deviation of 10% for 3000
32-bit patterns, as shown in Fig. 4(a). This is due to the
fact that the rf frequency response of Alice’s setup is rel-
atively flat throughout this region, see Fig. 3(a), meaning
that Eve is more successful in transmitting her pattern. This
is reflected in the fact that the longer runs are preserved in
(a) (b)
FIG. 4. (a) Proportion matched after filtering when Eve sends
3000 32-bit patterns in the case where Alice is using the band
from 625 MHz to 1.25 GHz to generate her output, comparing
Alice’s output to Eve’s injected signal (orange) and to the first
32 bits in Alice’s output (blue). (b) Comparison of occurrence of
different run lengths in the patterns sent by Eve and received by
Alice.
the CV QRNG output, as shown in Fig. 4(b). If as before
we compare Alice’s output to the first 32 bits within it the
match rises to 94% with a standard deviation of 3%, see
Fig. 4(a).
III. CONCLUSION
In this work we present an out-of-band signal injection
attack on a photonic QRNG through which an adver-
sary can gain full control of the output through EMI. We
present three proof-of-principle implementations against a
CV QRNG with a binary output, using common lab equip-
ment and a wideband isotropic antenna. The first is able
to achieve near perfect control of the output by exploiting
the out-of-band electromagnetic channel in a bidirectional
fashion: eavesdropping Alice’s clock for synchronization
and injecting a sine wave. This attack forces the output to
become a series of alternating 1s and 0s and could therefore
be spotted by a vigilant user performing statistical tests
on their output. We therefore investigate two scenarios in
which Eve can achieve high degrees of matching between
random patterns chosen by her and the CV QRNG out-
put. We anticipate these matches could be increased with a
more powerful and sophisticated transmitter setup, or per-
haps a different modulation scheme. When perfected, such
an attack would render any protection based on statisti-
cal tests on the output ineffective, highlighting the need
for implementing countermeasures specific to EMI attacks
(see Appendix H).
Our results are pertinent to the more common issue
of unintentional electromagnetic interference, which may
lead to the randomness of RNGs being degraded if they
are deployed in server racks or other noisy environments
with insufficient shielding. Out-of-band signal-injection
attacks on quantum technologies, such as quantum key dis-
tribution systems, are an as yet unexplored research area
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and could therefore pose previously unidentified security
threats that shall be investigated in future works.
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APPENDIX A: PROPORTION EVE GUESSES
INCORRECTLY
Eve aims to shift Alice’s distribution such that the out-
come of Alice’s measurement is most likely to fall in one
of the outer bins of her ADC, which are assumed to extend
from ±R to ±∞, and guesses that this will be Alice’s out-
put. The probability that this will not be the case can be
found by integrating the filled region under each curve
in Fig. 5. Given that the variance of the Gaussian is σ 2T ,
the probability that Eve will guess the outcome of Alice’s
measurement incorrectly is given by Eq. (1) in the main
text.
The widths of the inner bins of Alice’s ADC are shown
as being equal in Fig. 5, but could also be chosen such that
the outcome of Alice’s measurement is equally likely to
fall in each bin, see, for example, Ref. [31]. In either case,
Eve can maximize her guessing probability by maximizing
(a)
(b)
FIG. 5. (a),(b) Probability density function of Alice’s BHD
output in the absence (a) and presence (b) of Eve’s electromag-
netic signal, with which she shifts the mean of Alice’s Gaussian
distribution, indicated by the green line, to −A. The blue lines
indicate the edge of Alice’s ADC bins. The red lines indicate
the bottom edge of the two outer ADC bins, which are assumed
to extend from ±R to ±∞. The probability that Eve will guess
Alice’s output incorrectly can be found by integrating the filled
region.
the shift A that she induces in Alice’s output. Determin-
ing how Eve can modulate her injected signal to maximize
her guessing probability whilst remaining undetected by
statistical tests run by Alice on her output when she has
more than two bins is an interesting and complex problem,
which would depend not only on Alice’s choice of binning
but also on which statistical tests she is performing, and
shall not be discussed in any further detail in this work.
APPENDIX B: ABSOLUTE AUTOCORRELATION
Figure 6(a) shows that the data goes from being weakly
correlated for low lags, due to the finite bandwidth of the
detector, in the absence of EMI, to being strongly cor-
related for all lags when Eve injects a sine wave. The
absolute value of the autocorrelation of the binary output
for nonzero lags when Eve is injecting her signal can be










Figure 6(b) shows that the data obtained fit this prediction
well.








(yi − ȳ)(yi+k − ȳ), (B2)
where the mean ȳ = 1
n
∑i=n
i=1 yi. The autocorrelation func-





For the sake of compactness, assume that after threshold-
ing at 0 V Alice’s output will be +1 if the BHD output is
positive and −1 if it is negative, such that ȳ = 0. We then
(a) (b)
FIG. 6. (a) Autocorrelation of the binary QRNG output in the
presence and absence of EMI. (b) Dependence of the mean abso-
lute autocorrelation for nonzero lags on the normalized amplitude
of the shift induced by Eve.
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Taking the limit as n → ∞ and assuming that each ele-
ment is independent we can rewrite each sum as a sum over
possible outcomes weighted by their probabilities. Defin-
ing pi,j as the probability that Alice’s output will be i given
that Eve predicts it to be j , and using Eq. (1) with R = 0
we have








and p1,1 = p−1,−1 = 1 − p1,−1. Considering the odd and
even terms in the sums separately the autocorrelation for
odd lags is then given by
rodd =
p1,−1p1,1 − p−1,−1p1,1 + p−1,−1p−1,1 − p1,−1p−1,1
2(p1,−1 + p−1,−1)
+




which using the results above simplifies to
rodd = −(p21,1 − 2p1,1p1,−1 + p
2
1,−1)
= −(p1,1 − p1,−1)2
= −(1 − 2p1,−1)2. (B7)
Similarly it can be shown that reven = +(1 − 2p1,−1)2.
Substituting in the probability from above, we find that



















which matches Eq. (B1).
APPENDIX C: CONDITIONAL SHANNON
ENTROPY
The success of Eve’s attack in the case where she injects
a sine wave into Alice’s QRNG whose output is binary
can further be demonstrated by evaluating the conditional







p(x|y) log2 p(x|y), (C1)
where the conditional probability p(x|y) = [p(yx)/p(y)] is
the probability that event x will occur, given that event y
just occurred [49]. In the case of a binary output this can
be rewritten as













where for example p(0|1) = p(10)/p(1) corresponds to
the probability that Alice’s next output will be a 0 given
that her last bit was a 1. Details of the procedure to obtain
the necessary probabilities from experimental data can be
found in Ref. [49].
As shown in Fig. 7, Alice’s conditional Shannon entropy
decreases as the normalized shift, (A/
√
2σT), that Eve
imparts to Alice’s BHD output increases, reaching 0 for
sufficiently large shifts. If Alice were evaluating the condi-
tional Shannon entropy of her output, it would be clear to
her at this point that her output is completely predictable.
Crucially if instead Alice was simply evaluating the Shan-
non entropy of her output H = −
∑
x p(x) log2 p(x), the
value she would obtain would remain close to 1, and the
attack would go unnoticed.
The conditional Shannon entropy of Alice’s output can
be predicted by calculating each of the probabilities in
Eq. (C2) from Alice’s perspective who is assumed to be
unaware of Eve’s attack:




















FIG. 7. Comparison between predicted and experimental val-
ues of the Shannon entropy (H ), conditional Shannon entropy
(HS), and conditional min-entropy (Hmin) of 1-Gbit binary output
from Alice’s QRNG as a function of normalized shift imparted
by Eve.
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The conditional Shannon entropy is then given by




































As shown in Fig. 7 the experimental data fits this prediction
well. The conditional min-entropy, for which we assume
that the side information available to Eve is whether she
was trying to send a 1 or a 0 at each sampling point, is also
plotted in Fig. 7 to highlight how much this side informa-
tion improves Eve’s guessing probability. This guessing
probability would further increase if, as in many QRNG
protocols, we assume that the electronic noise from the
detector is known to Eve.
APPENDIX D: EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
For our proof-of-principle experimental implementation
we focus on the case in which Alice obtains her digital
output by thresholding the BHD output at 0 V. The QRNG
setup consists of a laser diode, connected to a variable opti-
cal attenuator (VOA), the output of which is connected to
a 50:50 fiber coupler. The second input of the coupler is
blocked as to provide a vacuum input. The two outputs
from the coupler are connected to a Thorlabs PDB480C-
AC BHD. Unless otherwise stated, the LO power is set
just below the power at which the BHD saturates, such that
around 4.7 mW is incident on each photodiode.
For the experiments in which Eve is sending a sine
wave, the output is sampled at 1 GSamples/s using a ded-
icated ADC board. In this case the board’s 1-GHz clock
is picked up by placing an Aim-TTi PSA-ANT2 antenna
close to the ADC board, the output from which is fil-
tered and then frequency divided to provide the 10-MHz
reference for Eve’s setup, making the attack contactless.
A schematic of this setup is shown in Fig. 2(a).
For the experiments in which more complex patterns are
sent, the output from the BHD is sampled at 40 GSam-
ples/s using an oscilloscope, then downsampled to 2.5
GSamples/s in postprocessing. Sampling at a high rate then
downsampling to the required rate gives more flexibility in
choosing the sampling point. In this case we assume that
FIG. 8. Schematic of setup. LO, local oscillator; VOA, vari-
able optical attenuator; BHD, balanced homodyne detector; Osc,
oscilloscope; PG, pattern generator; SG, signal generator; Mix,
mixer; Ant, antenna. Inset: Illustration of Eve’s modulation
scheme.
Eve has direct access to Alice’s clock and trigger the oscil-
loscope on Eve’s pattern generator output. A schematic of
the setup is shown in Fig. 8.
The injected electromagnetic signal is generated using a
signal generator in the case where we send a sine wave,
and with a combination of said signal generator and a
pattern generator whose outputs are combined using a
mixer when sending more complex patterns. The signal is
amplified to 24 dBm and then transmitted using an Aim-
TTi PSA-ANT2 isotropic wideband antenna placed a few
centimeters away from the BHD.
Whilst we cannot be certain which part of the system
acts as an unintentional antenna and picks up the electro-
magnetic signal we suspect it is a combination of the power
supply cable and the output SMA, as placing the antenna
parallel and in close proximity to these close to their con-
nections to the BHD box produces the largest response.
The BHD circuit board may also be responsible although
it is held in a shielded aluminum box [16,50,51].
APPENDIX E: UNSYNCHRONIZED CLOCKS
In the main text we consider the case where Eve can
obtain Alice’s clock and hence synchronize her attack with
Alice’s sampling, we now consider what happens if this
is not the case. To keep the analysis simple we restrict
ourselves to considering the case where Eve sends a sine
wave at half Alice’s sampling frequency. If Eve is unable
to synchronize her clock with Alice’s, Alice will no longer
sample Eve’s injected sine wave on the extrema, instead
Alice’s sampling point will drift along Eve’s sine wave.
Assuming that the clocks are stable, the shift imparted by
Eve will evolve over time, t, as A cos(ft), where f is
the difference between the frequency of Eve’s signal and
half Alice’s sampling rate. As shown by the experimental
results in Fig. 9 if we subsample short sections of Alice’s
output, taking every other point, and calculate the mean
shift imparted by Eve, we see that it oscillates sinusoidally
as predicted.
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FIG. 9. Evolution over time of (a) the mean shift imparted by
Eve, (b) the proportion of bits Eve guesses incorrectly and (c)
the absolute value of the nonzero lag autocorrelation for 100 000
samples when Eve and Alice’s clocks are not synchronized.
The proportion wrong and absolute nonzero autocorre-
lation show the same periodicity and can be accurately
predicted from the normalized shift imparted by Eve using
Eqs. (1) and (B1) respectively, as shown in Fig. 10.
APPENDIX F: EXPERIMENTALLY VARYING THE
NORMALIZED SHIFT
Figures 11 and 12 provide further details of the param-
eters used to produce Fig. 2(d). In Fig. 11(a) we show
that increasing the power output by Eve’s signal generator
increases the shift imparted by Eve and hence the distance
between the two extrema in the overall distribution (solid
line). The distributions obtained after subsampling, taking
(a)
(b)
FIG. 10. Proportion of bits that Eve guesses incorrectly (a) and
mean absolute nonzero autocorrelation for binary output (b) as a
function of the normalized shift imparted by Eve.
(a)
(b)
FIG. 11. 8-bit histograms for (a) fixed 4.6-mW LO power and
varying signal generator power, and (b) fixed 3-dBm signal gen-
erator power and varying LO power. Overall distribution (solid
line). Distribution taking every other sample (fill).
every other point, are also plotted (filled) to emphasize the
fact that they are simply shifted Gaussians.
Figure 11(b) shows that increasing the LO power
increases the width of the Gaussians. Further to this Fig.
12(a) shows that the variance of the subsampled distribu-
tions remains proportional to the LO power in the presence
of EMI and that Eve’s attack does not significantly change
this variance compared to that obtained when she is not
attacking. Figure 12(b) shows the dependence of the ampli-
tude of the shift imparted by Eve on the power output from
Eve’s signal generator.
APPENDIX G: RANDOMNESS EXTRACTION
It is worth pointing out that CV QRNGs are normally
provided with a unit for the application of so-called ran-
domness extractors, i.e., algorithms to enhance the statis-
tical uniformity of ADC samples and make them more
difficult to predict. However, with this kind of attack this
unit would be of little use. All the postprocessing steps
(a)
(b)
FIG. 12. (a) Dependence of the variance of the subsam-
pled waveforms, taking every other sample, on the LO power.
(b) Dependence of the amplitude of the shift, A, imparted by Eve
on the signal generator power.
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applied by Alice in order to extract her final output from
the bits must be known to Eve [52] and do not add any
entropy to the output, therefore they cannot make the final
output unpredictable to Eve if she knows the raw input.
Worse still, it is common to only apply randomness test
to the postprocessed bits in CV QRNG implementations
[32,34,36–38,40,41,44–47]. Such tests ought to be passed
even in the case where Alice’s raw output is a string of
alternating 0s and 1s if, for example, the raw output is
hashed using a Toeplitz matrix, meaning that Alice will
fail to spot even this simpler version of our attack [53].
APPENDIX H: COUNTERMEASURES
Countermeasures against electromagnetic interference,
intentional or not, have been the subject of extensive
research. It has been shown that shielding, differential cou-
pling, and filtering can be applied to effectively attenuate
electromagnetic signals [16,29,54,55]. Such countermea-
sures only attenuate Eve’s signal and can therefore be
overcome by Eve sending a more powerful signal. If
instead Alice wishes to detect that the attack is taking
place, she could monitor the power reaching the ADC as
this will increase considerably during the attack. Alice may
also place an antenna close to the RNG to monitor the
electromagnetic background [29]. The need to implement
monitoring ahead of the ADC has previously been high-
lighted in Refs. [56,57] and in the AIS.31 standards in the
form of total failure tests on the entropy source [8].
As discussed above, in the case where Alice has only
two bins, it is possible for Eve to adapt her input to render
Alice’s statistical tests ineffective. This becomes more dif-
ficult for Eve as the number of ADC bins increases as any
shift imparted to Alice’s output by Eve will increase the
occurrence of samples in the outer bins. Alice may then be
able to detect the attack by counting the occurrence of sam-
ples in these bins. This countermeasure can be made more
effective if Alice counts the number of samples in the outer
bins after randomly switching off the LO, as in a typical
CV QRNG setup this will drastically reduce the probabil-
ity of a measurement falling in the outer bins [32,55,58].
A detailed overview of further potential countermeasures
against out-of-band signal-injection attacks in general can
be found in Refs. [16,51].
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